基于动态博弈线上非诚实行为监管模型研究

    A Study of Digital Dynamic Game Regulatory Data Models for Online Dishonest Behaviour

    • 摘要: 近年来随着互联网特别是移动互联网的飞速发展,企业利用信息化便利开展业务以期降本增效,人们通过互联网平台消费购物,获得极大便利,同时,由于在互联网化的市场交易中双方信息均存在不对称问题,导致交易双方,特别是厂商或经销商更有驱动力通过提供虚假信息、发布不实参数等手段以增加交易对手的成本,由此导致线上市场主体非诚实行为日渐增多,形成市场监管难题。针对线上非诚实市场行为的监管问题,以动态博弈基本原理及均衡理论为基础,建立了一种数字化监管数据模型——线上非诚实行为数字化动态博弈监管数据模型。具体而言,提出一种线上非诚实行一般化形式描述框架,进而由简到繁建立“单一商户”、“多商户”及“多商户多商品”的动态博弈监管数据模型,然后对各方在动态博弈中的过程表现及策略选择进行讨论,为线上非诚实行为的数字化监管提供了基础解决方案。

       

      Abstract: In recent years, with the rapid development of the Internet, especially the mobile Internet, enterprises use information technology to facilitate business acquisition, people through the Internet platform shopping and consumption, to provide great convenience for economic and social development, at the same time, due to the Internet-based market transactions on both sides of the information is asymmetric, resulting in the transaction between the two sides, in particular, manufacturers or distributors are more driven to increase the cost of the counterparty through the provision of false information, release of untruths and other means. At the same time, due to the asymmetry of information between the two parties in Internet-based market transactions, both parties, especially vendors and distributors, are driven to provide false information and publish inaccurate parameters in order to increase the counterparty’s costs. Aiming at the regulation of online non-honest market behaviours, this paper establishes a digital regulatory model “Digital Dynamic Game Regulatory Model for Online Non-Honest Behaviours” based on the basic principles of dynamic game and equilibrium theory. Specifically, this paper puts forward a generalised formal description framework for online dishonest practices, and then establishes a dynamic game regulatory model for “single merchant”, “multiple merchants” and “multiple merchants and multiple commodities” from simple to complex. A dynamic game regulatory model is then developed, and the process performance and strategy choices of each party in the dynamic game are discussed, providing a basic solution for the digital regulation of online dishonest behaviours.

       

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